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CASE NOTES

examination at the bookstore whether or not the book is obscene. If
through his quick scanning of the book, he determines that it is not obscene, but when he reads it at home discovers that it is obscene, he is
guilty of violating the statute.
On the other hand, the states obviously believe that there is a causal
relationship between obscene material and antisocial behavior.29 But the
question then is: "Should the reader be subject to prosecution if he unknowingly purchases obscene literature?" States must have obscenity
statutes, but the watch word must be reasonableness. Reasonableness here
should be the coupling of knowing possession with some intent, and in
the appeal of State v. Mapp30 presently pending before the United States
Supreme Court, it is believed that the Court will recognize the latter fact
and declare the Ohio statute unconstitutional.
29 For an excellent criticism of the view that there is no causal relationship between
obscene literature and anti-social activities, see Schmidt, A Justificationof Statutes Barring Pornographyfron the Mail, 26 FORDHAM L. REv. 70 (1957).
30 29 U.S.L. VEEK 3046 (U.S. July 14, 1960) (No. 236).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE STATUTE PROHIBITING
COLLECTION OF DUES IF UNION OFFICER CONVICTED
OF FELONY, HELD CONSTITUTIONAL
A New York statute, the New York Waterfront Commission Act of
1953, section 8,1 prohibited the collection of dues on behalf of any
waterfront labor organization if any officer or agent of such organization
had been convicted of a felony and had not been pardoned or given a
certificate of good conduct from a board of parole. Defendant, District
Attorney of Richmond County, threatened to prosecute anyone collecting dues for Local 1346 of the International Longshoremen's Association,
because its Secretary-Treasurer, the plaintiff, had pleaded guilty to a
charge of grand larceny in 1920 and had received a suspended sentence.
By reason of this threat, plaintiff was suspended as an officer of Local
1346. An action for a declaratory judgment was thereupon instituted,
plaintiff claiming section 8 to be in conflict with the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution, and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. It was further alleged that section 8 constituted a
bill of attainder and was an ex post facto law. The Supreme Court of
the United States, by a five to three decision (Mr. Justice Harlan took
no part in the consideration or decision of the case), affirmed the lower
courts and upheld the validity of the Waterfront Commission Act, stating
I N.Y.

UN coNSOL. LAWS § 6700

(McKinney Supp. 1960).
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that it was a reasonable means for achieving a legitimate state aim. De
Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
The critical questions concerning the constitutionality of state labor
relations legislation arise with respect to the extent of supersedure of
state power by virtue of the enactment of federal legislation. Under the
federal supremacy clause of the United States Constitution-article VI,
section 2-federal law precludes state regulation in a field already occupied by Congress. With this simple formula, there would seem to be
no problem. However, such has not been the case.
In the DeVeau case the Supreme Court was faced with the question of
whether the New York act so contradicted a provision of the National
Labor Relations Act of 1934 as to restrict the right of employees to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.2 On
April 12, 1937, the Court had upheld the constitutionality of the original
N.L.R.A., stating that the commerce power was broad enough to authorize the regulation of the labor relations of the employees there in3
volved, whose activities were found to "affect" interstate commerce.
However, the N.L.R.A. does not automatically preclude a state from
legislating in the area of labor-management relations, so long as this
legislation does not materially obstruct the exercise of rights conferred
by the N.L.R.A. or other federal legislation. 4 The enactment of the
N.L.R.A. does not supersede a state act as to labor relations which do
not so affect interstate commerce as to bring them within the commerce
clause, and a state may exercise its police power even as to those labor relationships which fall within the commerce clause, unless the N.L.R.A.
has excluded its operation in this field. 5 Of course, in case of a conflict in
the administration of the state act and the N.L.R.A., the state must
yield. 6 It is manifest that a state law cannot override the constitutional
7
authority of the Federal Government.
In the DeVeau case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority,
National Labor Relations Act (1934), §§ 1, 7, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151, 157
(Supp. 1959). Section 7 of the N.L.R.A. declares categorically that "employees shall
have the right ... to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosin g .... "
3 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The companion cases
were NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry
Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103
(1937); and Washington, Virginia &Maryland Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937).
4 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Local 111, United Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
5 Wisconsin Labor Relations Bd. v. Fred Rueping Leather Co., 228 Wis. 473, 279
N.W.673 (1938).
6 Ibid.
7 Consolidated

Edison Co., v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
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stated that section 8 of the Waterfront Commission Act did not operate
to deprive waterfront employees of opportunity to choose bargaining
representatives, since itmerely disabled them from choosing as their
representatives ex-felons who had neither been pardoned nor received
"good conduct" certificates. The situation was not such that the operation of the state statute so obviously contradicted a federal enactment
that it precluded both from functioning together, or would impede the
effectiveness of the federal measure. The failure of Congress to envisage
the possibility that state legislatures might seek to limit employees' freedom of choice, and its failure explicitly to proscribe such limitations,
demonstrated that a state could, without violating congressional policy,
forbid employees to bargain through ex-felons.
The dissent, written by Mr. Justice Douglas, and concurred in by Mr.
Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Black, relied mainly on the case of
Hill v. Florida."In the Hill case, a Florida statute made it a misdemeanor,
without first obtaining a license, to act as "business agent" of a labor
organization. No license was to be granted to any person who had not
been a citizen of and resident of the United States for more than ten
years immediately preceding the filing of his application, or who had
been convicted of a felony or was not of good moral character. Hill, a
business agent of the United Association of Journeymen Plumbers and
Steamfitters, Local 243, claimed that the statute violated the fourteenth
amendment and conflicted with the collective bargaining provisions of
the N.L.R.A. The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black,
held that the licensing section of the statute "circumscribes the 'full freedom' of choice which Congress said employees should possess."
The dissent in the DeVeau case further felt that the Waterfront Act,
section 8, had been so construed and applied that the union and its selected representatives were prohibited from functioning as collective
bargaining agents, or in any other capacity, except upon conditions fixed
by New York.
Actual or potential abuses of power by unions have aroused an increasing amount of public concern. 10 The growing public interest in this
general problem has been reflected in recent decisions upholding state
8 325 U.S. 538 (1944).
91d. at 541. Cf. UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd, 336 US. 245 (1949);
Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). For a discussion of Hill v. Florida,
325 U.S. 538 (1944), see Dodd, The Supreme Court and Organized Labor, 1241-45, 58
HARv. L. REv. 1018, at 1062-66 (1945).
10 Witness, for example, the Hearings before the House of Representatives on this
subject: Hearings on H.R. 6286, H-R. 6321, H.R. 6343, & S. 2383, Before Subcommittee
Three of the House Committee on the Judiciary,83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
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legislation regulating in varying degrees the internal affairs of unions."
The New York statute is an example of such legislation. The situation
in New York which brought about the Waterfront Act was described
in a detailed report published by the New York State Crime Commission
in May 1953.12 The Commission reported that the skulduggeries on the
waterfront were due largely to the domination over waterfront employment gained by the International Longshoremens' Association, as then
conducted. Its employment practices easily led to corruption, and manv
of its officials participated in dishonesties. The presence on the waterfront of convicted felons in many influential positions was an important
causative factor in this appalling situation.
Until the Taft-Hartley Act 8 in 1947, the federal labor law had never
attempted to regulate the internal operations of unions, the conduct of
their daily affairs, or their financial operations. The act extended state
power in the field of labor disputes affecting interstate commerce by
empowering the N.L.R.B., in its discretion, to cede to the state jurisdiction over certain labor disputes, even though they affected interstate
commerce. 14 In 1959, Congress took further steps to impose restrictions
upon union officers and the internal affairs of unions. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,15 section 504 (a), pro"' Linehan v. Waterfront Comm'n., 116 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Linehan v.
Waterfront Comm'n., 112 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd., 347 U.S. 439 (1954);
Staten Island Loaders, Inc. v. Waterfront Comm'n., 117 F. Supp. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1953),
aff'd., 347 U.S. 439 (1954); O'Rourke v. Waterfront Comm'n., 118 F. Supp. 236
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Hazelton v. Murray,.21 N.J. 115, 121 A.2d 1 (1956). In the second
Linehan case, supra, Judge Augustus Hand wrote:
"Since we hold that the Act is within the police power of the state, the numerous
objections to it generally based on violation of the Constitution would all seem to be
without foundation. This is a new type of regulation, drawn to meet an emergency
and reasonably related to the public interest." Id. at 685.
124 N.Y. State Crime Comm'n. Rep. (1953).
13 29 U.S.CA. §§ 141-188 (Supp. 1959). For a discussion of the first federal attempt
to regulate internal operations of unions, see DUNLOP AND HEALY, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, PRINCIPLES AND CASES 20 (1953); and Lyon, The Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act, 1959, 9 DE PAUL L. REv. 159, at 160 (1960).
14 Section 10(a) of the N.L.R.A. states: "The Board is empowered, as hereinafter
provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice ... affectmg interstate commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adlustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise: Provided, that the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any
State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry
...even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting interstate commerce,
unless the provisions of the State of Territorial Statute applicable to the determination
of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provisions of this
Act or has received a contruction inconsistent therewith." 29 U.S.C.A. S 10(a) (Supp.
1959).
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-604 (1959).
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vided that "no person ...

who has been convicted of, or served any part

of a prison term resulting from his conviction of [a group of serious
felonies] . . . shall serve-(1) as an officer . . . of any labor organization
.. . for five years after such conviction . ... "16 In sections 205 (c) and

403 of the act, express provisions excluding the operation of state law
were included. No such pre-emption provision was provided in connection with Section 504 (a). Section 604 of the 1959 Act provides: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to impair or diminish the authority of
any State to enact and enforce general criminal laws with respect to [the
same group of serious felonies, with the exception of exclusively federal
violations, which are listed in Section 504 (a)]."' 7 Section 603 (a) is an
express disclaimer of pre-emption of state laws regulating the responsibilities of union officials, except where such pre-emption is expressly
provided in the 1959 act.'
The states themselves have not ignored the problem of the internal
affairs of unions and their effect upon the public welfare. A considerable
number of states have enacted labor relations statutes. Some of these are
in form "little Wagner Acts," having been modeled on the original
N.L.R.A., and therefore contain restrictions upon employers only. 19
Most of these statutes, however, contain restrictions both upon employer
and upon union or employee conduct. 20 Illinois has no such legislation,

and the rights of the parties to a labor dispute-where such parties are
not subject to federal law-are thus largely determined by common-law
21
actions in the Illinois courts.
Thus it can be seen that both at the federal and state level the problem
of the union, its officials and members, has resulted in the passage of
legislation directly affecting the internal affairs of unions. The De Vean
16 U.S.C.A. §504(a) (Supp. 1959).
17

29 U.S.C.A. S604 (Supp. 1959).

18 Section 603 (a) provides: "Except as explicitly provided to the contrary, nothing
in this Act shall reduce or limit the responsibilities of any labor organization or any
officer, agent, shop steward, or other representative of a labor organization ... under
the laws of any State...." 29 U.S.C.A. § 603 (a) (Supp. 1959).
19

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

ch. 561, §§31-101 to -111 (1960); N.Y. CONSOL.

9§700-16 (McKinney Supp. 1960); PA. STAT.

ANN.

LAWS ANN.

ch. 43 §§ 211.1-.3 (Purdon Supp.

1959); R.I. GEN. LAWS ch. 7 §§ 28-7-1 to -47 (Supp. 1959).
20
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 97, § 94 (Supp. 1960); KANS. GEN.

STAT. ANN.

ch. 44,

§§ 802-17 (Supp. 1959);

MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151 B, S4 (Supp. 1959); MICH. STAT. ANN.
S 17.454 1960); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 179.42 (Supp. 1959); N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS ANN.

§ 720-32 (McKinney Supp. 1960); PA. STAT. ANN. ch. 43 §§ 211.31-.39 (Purdon Supp.
1959); UTAH CODE ANN. ch. 34 §§ 1-19 to -34 (Supp. 1959); WIs. STAT. ANN. S 111.07
(West, Supp. 1959).
21 For the view that there is a lack of statutory law in Illinois regulating internal affairs
of unions, see Lyon, supra note 13. at 162.
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case seems to be an affirmance of the recognition of abuses of power by
unions, and an attempt to deal with a cause of these abuses in a manner
not contradictory to a federal enactment: The majority felt that the
New York Act did not conflict with the provisions of the N.L.R.A. The
members of the Court who were in the majority in declaring the Florida
statute unconstitutional in the Hill case of 1944 are in the minority in the
De Veau case. The Court seems to feel today that a curb upon union
abuses by means of both state and federal enactments which are not directly in opposition is more important than an unrestricted guarantee to
the employees of unions of a right to choose their own collective bargaining representative officers without any interference from state labor relations laws.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTE AUTHORIZING
SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT UPHELD BY
REASON OF EQUAL DIVISION OF
SUPREME COURT
Earl Taylor, defendant, owned and resided in a private residence in
Dayton, Ohio. Three housing inspectors sought admittance to his home
pursuant to a city ordinance which authorized them to enter any dwelling, at a reasonable hour and upon showing proper identification, for the
purpose of inspecting the dwelling to determine if it conformed to the
miminum standards of health and safety as set forth in subsequent sections.1 The inspectors carried no credentials and were refused entry by

the defendant. They returned later with identification, and the defendant
inquired as to the reason for inspecting his home. The inspectors gave
no reason or cause for the particular inspection, but merely told the
defendant that they had a right to inspect any home. The defendant
asked them if they had a search warrant and when told that they did not,
he again refused entry. He was subsequently served with a warrant to
appear in court for violation of the ordinance, which violation could
1

DAYTON, OHIO, CITY ORDINANCES No. 18099, § 806.30 provides: "The Housing
Inspector is hereby authorized and directed to make inspections to determine the con-

dition of dwellings, dwelling units, rooming houses, rooming units and premises located
within the City of Dayton in order that he may perform his duty of safeguarding the
health and safety of the occupants of dwellings and of the general public. For the
purpose of making such inspections and upon showing appropriate identification the
Housing Inspector is hereby authorized to enter, examine and survey at any reasonable
hour all dwellings, dwelling units, rooming houses, rooming units, and premises. The
owner or occupant of every dwelling, dwelling unit, rooming house, and rooming unit
or the person in charge thereof, shall give the Housing Inspector free access to such
dwelling, dwelling unit, rooming house or rooming unit and its premises at any reasonable hour for the purpose of such inspection, examination and survey."

